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Abstract – In counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD), two remote parties can securely
share random polarization-encoded bits through the blocking rather than the transmission of
particles. We propose a semi-counterfactual QKD, i.e., one where the secret bit is shared, and
also encoded, based on the blocking or non-blocking of a particle. The scheme is thus semi-
counterfactual and not based on polarization encoding. As with other counterfactual schemes
and the Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol, but unlike BB84, the encoding states are orthogonal and
security arises ultimately from single-particle non-locality. Unlike any of them, however, the secret
bit generated is maximally indeterminate until the joint action of Alice and Bob. We prove the
general security of the protocol, and study the most general photon-number-preserving incoherent
attack in detail.
Introduction. – Quantum key distribution (QKD)
is a method allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to share
a secret key, whose secrecy is protected by the laws of
quantum mechanics (QM), such as no-cloning and the
indistinguishability of non-orthogonal states [1]. It re-
mains the most advanced application of quantum infor-
mation theory experimentally [2], and even commercially.
Since the proposal of the first QKD protocol [3], various
paradigms of QKD have been proposed such as use of en-
tanglement [4, 5], orthogonal states [6, 7], two-way com-
munication [8–10], secure direct communication [11–14]
and, most recently, counterfactual QKD (CQKD) [15,16],
which is based on the idea of interaction-free measurement
[17]. CQKD involves secret key sharing through blocking
rather than transmission of a particle. The Noh protocol
[15] has since been made more efficient [18] and its secu-
rity investigated [19–21]. Recently, it was experimentally
implemented [22].
In this work, we describe a scheme for CQKD which,
unlike the counterfactual protocols of Refs. [15, 16], does
not use polarization encoding. To see why this is interest-
ing, it is worth noting that the idea of information trans-
fer without particle transmission really means information
transfer by blocking signals. This can be done classically,
too. A ‘classical’ version of the Noh protocol would be:
Alice transmits a red or blue ball to Bob, who randomly
applies a color-based blocking operation. If he applies a
red-blocker, and Alice transmitted a red ball, then he holds
back the ball, else he transmits it back. Similarly, for the
blue-blocker. Alice and Bob share a bit, determined by the
ball color, whenever Alice does not receive a ball. Natu-
rally, this classical protocol is completely insecure because
Eve can determine the color of the ball during the forward
transmission, and find out if Bob returns the ball. In the
quantum mechanical version, however, Bob’s blocking can
spoil distructive interference on Alice’s side, leading to a
particle detection far away from Bob’s blockade, which is
the counterfactual element. If Eve tries to find the color
(read: polarization), she commits the ball (read: particle)
to the Alice or Bob path, potentially disrupting the path
superposition state in which the particle would otherwise
be prepared, which is the basis of security.
Now if both bits are to be generated by Bob’s blocking
act, then encoding on basis of some internal degree of free-
dom (such as polarization or spin) would be needed. If now
we require counterfactuality only on one bit value, then
one of the bits would be generated by blocking and the
other by transmission. But in that case, the act of blocking
or non-blocking itself could be used to encode bits, thereby
‘freeing’ polarization from the duty. Alice thus transmits
a ball to Bob, and he blocks or does not block it. Alice
deduces the bit according to whether she receives or does
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not receive his trasnmission. The second case represents
the counterfactual bit. Our semi-counterfactual QKD pro-
tocol is the secure quantum version of this classical idea.
Apart from the conceptual clarification it provides to the
counterfactual paradigm in cryptography, it has the prac-
tical benefit of allowing polarization to be used to be used
for security against certain Trojan horse attacks.
This article is structured as follows. In the following
section, we present the new protocol, and compare and
contrast it with some other related protocols in the subse-
quent section. Thereafter, the security of the protocol is
discussed, followed by a discussion on the role of the trans-
lated no-cloning theorem in the present protocol. Next we
prove the security under a general incoherent attack in the
noiseless scenario. However, in practice, noise is ubiqui-
tous. This is taken into consideration in the subsequent
section, where we derive the tolerable error rate for a re-
stricted, incoherent photon-number- preserving attacks.
A new scheme . – Light from the source S hits
the beamsplitter BS and splits into two beams one along
Alice’s arm a (A) and another Bob’s arm b (A) respec-
tively.The quantum state after BS is
|φ〉AB =
√
T |00〉A|ψ〉B + i
√
R|ψ〉A|00〉B, (1)
where T and R represent the coefficients of transmittance
and reflectance of the BS respectively such that T = 1−R,
and |00〉 represents the vacuum state in the two polariza-
tion modes H and V , while |ψ〉 represents a single photon
state of arbitrary polarization, i.e., |ψ〉 = α|10〉 + β|01〉
with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. The first (second) ket refers to the
transmitted (reflected) or Alice (Bob) arm.
Alice and Bob each possess a switch SW, an absorber
Abs and a Faraday mirror FM. Each of the participants
either applies the operation F (reflect) or A (absorb) de-
pending on the state of the switch, which is randomly on or
off, respectively. Ideally, the two SW’s are independently
controlled by a quantum random number generator. The
three possibilties are: (1) Both SW’s are on, so that Alice
and Bob reflect their beams which causes an interference
pattern at the detector D1 (D2) with probability (T −R)2
(4RT ); (2) One of the SW’s is on while the other is off.
This results in a detection at D2 with probability RT , due
to the physical travel of light along only one of the arms.
If Alice (Bob) did the blocking, then the probability for
detection at D1 is T
2 (R2), with the probability for ab-
sorption at the respective module being R (T ). This is the
mode (on-off or off-on) in which a secret bit is generated.
By convention, it is labelled either 0 or 1 depending on
whether Alice or Bob applies the A operation. The proto-
col is counterfactual with respect to Bob when secret bit 1
is generated; (3) The last possibility is that both the SW’s
are in the off mode resulting in Alice and Bob applying
the operation A and there is no detection both at D1 and
D2.
The counterfactual nature of the protocol comes from
the fact that the secret bit 1 is extracted by the
Detection Pattern (Alice, Bob)
D1 ((F,A),
1
4
), ((A,F ), 1
4
)
D2 ((F, F ), 1), ((F,A),
1
4
), ((A,F ), 1
4
)
Null ((F,A), 1
2
), ((A,F ), 1
2
), ((A,A), 1)
Table 1: The allowed pattern of Alice’s and Bob’s action along
with the probability that a detector click was produced.
interaction-free detection of Bob’s A setting. A detec-
tion at D1 is determined by the presence of an absorber
which did not scatter the particle. When secret bit 0 is
generated, it is counterfactual with respect to the internal
arm a, but the photon travels physically along Bob’s arm
b. In this sense, the protocol is only semi-counterfactual
with respect to the exposed arm.
The corresponding patterns of operations and out-
comes are summarized in Table 1. The efficiency of
the protocol is defined by the probability P (D1) =
P (D1|(F,A))P ((F,A)) + P (D1|(A,F ))P ((A,F )) = 14 14 +
1
4
1
4
= 1
8
, which is the same as in the Noh protocol.
The protocol steps are as follows: (I) n photons are
sequentially injected from the left-hand side of the appa-
ratus in Figure (1). (II) Depending on the random switch
state, Alice applies F or A in the arm a on each photon,
and so does Bob in arm b. (III) On the n outcome data
collected, a fraction f is randomly selected, for which Al-
ice and Bob both announce their settings and outcome
information. They check that the observed statistics is
sufficiently close to Table 1. Two figures of merit are the
visibility of the interference fringes
V ≡ P (D2|F, F )− P (D1|F, F )
P (D1|F, F ) + P (D2|F, F ) . (2)
and the error rate
e ≡ P (F, F |D1) + P (A,A|D1), (3)
which estimates the fraction of mismatched secret bits.
Two other figures of merit are estimates on r, the rate of
multiple count, which may be due to dark counts or certain
photon-number- non-preserving attacks, and λ, transmis-
sion loss rate over the channel. (IV) If V (e) is sufficiently
close to 1 (0), then the remaining approximately (1−f)n/8
bits corresponding to D1 detection are used for further
classical post-processing to extract a smaller secure key
via key reconciliation and privacy amplification.
If the timings of pulses where not random, and Eve
knew them, she would probe Bob’s setting by entering a
photon into the path b and studying it upon return, using
an Alice-like set-up. As one method of protection against
such a Trojan horse attack [21] Alice sends her pulses ran-
domly. She and Bob later compare that in the events
where Bob applied the operation A and detected the pho-
ton, the time ti when the photon was sent by Alice satisfies
ts = tr−τ , where tr is the time of Bob’s receipt, and τ the
photon transit time. As a simpler alternative, Alice can
vary the polarization randomly between the BB84 states
p-2
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Fig. 1: Semi-counterfactual quantum cryptography: The ex-
perimental architecture of the proposed QKD using Michelson-
type interferometer. Alice’s station consisting of the source S
initiates the protocol by sending light pulses through the op-
tical circulator OC to the beamsplitter BS, which splits them
into beams along arms a and b. The optical delay OD main-
tains the phase between the arm by compensating for the path
difference in the two arms. Light along arm a is subjected
to absorption or reflection by Alice based on her switch state.
Likewise by Bob along arm b who also possesses SW, Abs and
FM.
|V 〉, |H〉, 1√
2
(|V 〉±|H〉) and Bob’s A operation may be ac-
companied by a polarization measurement. Trojan horse
attacks by Eve to probe Bob’s settings can be detected by
later verifying the polarization in his detection events.
Comparison and contrast with some other pro-
tocols . – It is worth comparing and contrasting the
present protocol with others that employ single pho-
tons: e.g., the counterfactual protocols, BB84 [3] or the
Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol (GV) [6]. In all these cases,
except BB84 (which uses conjugate coding), the encod-
ing is with orthogonal states. In particular, the actions
(A,F ) and (F,A), when they can lead to a D1 detection,
produce the orthogonal states, |00〉A|ψ〉B and |ψ〉A|00〉B,
respectively. As with these other orthogonal-state-based
protocols, single-particle non-locality, and restricting the
observables that Eve can access, is the key to security.
Our protocol, however, differs from the other
orthogonal-state-based protocols in one respect worth not-
ing. The initial state transmitted by Alice is the same in
all cases. Only after Alice’s and Bob’s actions is the secret
bit generated. In GV, the secret bit is deterministic, while
in the Noh protocol, Alice decides the polarization before-
hand, so that if a detection is accepted (with probability
= 1/8), then the secret bit is fixed by the polarization
chosen earlier. By contrast, in the present protocol, the
secret bit is decided only after Alice’s and Bob’s actions.
Security . – Intuitively, security arises from single-
particle nonlocality: Eve’s attempt to determine Bob’s ac-
tion will tend to localize the particle into one or the other
arm, forcing a particle nature, and thereby disrupting the
coherence between the two geographically separated wave
packets in the two arms. This will be reflected in a re-
duction of visibility, which can be observed. However, the
protocol is two-way, meaning that in some form (either
physically or as a vacuum), the particle is re-exposed after
Bob responds, and one needs to be sure that Eve cannot
exploit the difference between the ingoing and outcoming
states.
When the secret bit generated is 1, then Bob applied the
operation A, and the photon never physically travelled on
the exposed arm b. This seems to make the generation of
this bit inherently safe from an eavesdropper Eve monitor-
ing the arm. This is the intuition behind the expectation
that counterfactuality helps security. However, quantum
optically, non-travelling of a physical particle entails the
travel of a vacuum pulse, with a non-trivial physical conse-
quence. Thus a claim for security cannot be made without
more detailed consideration.
Translated no-cloning theorem . In the Noh proto-
col, the reduced density operator of the particle in the ex-
posed arm during the forward transmission is polarization-
dependent, and thus correlated with the secret state. How-
ever, the correlated states are non-orthogonal, and the
protocol’s security is attributed to this non-orthogonality.
In particular, Eve’s action would be to evolve the exposed
wave packet with an ancilla prepared in state |m〉E such
that U |sj〉B|m〉E = |sj〉B |mj〉E with j = 1, 2. However,
unitarity demands that 〈s1|s2〉 = B〈s1|s2〉BE〈m1|m2〉E ,
implying that for cloning to work, either |s1〉 and |s2〉 are
orthogonal or |m1〉 = |m2〉 and Eve gains no informa-
tion. Thus Eve’s any action that gains information will
disturb the state of Alice’s and Bob’s particle, implying
an information-vs-disturbance trade-off. In the backward
transmission, both bit values are represented by the vac-
uum state.
In the present protocol, the state of the particle
sent out by Alice is the same for either bit, namely
1
2
|00〉〈00| + 1
4
(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|). But during the back-
ward transmission, the states corresponding to the secret
bits are represented in the exposed arm by |00〉B and
1
2
(B|01〉〈01|B + B|10〉〈10|B), which are orthogonal. The
above reasoning would imply that our protocol is inse-
cure. We will find below that this is not the case, mainly
because the encoding states are not orthogonal to |φ〉AB ,
and that here too we have a situation with information-
vs-disturbance trade-off.
General incoherent attack. In the most general, co-
herent attack, Eve prepares n ancillas in the state |ǫ1〉⊗n
and another n in the state |ǫ2〉⊗n. She has each particle
interact with an ancilla prepared in state |ǫ1〉 using uni-
tary UO in the onward leg, and then with one prepared in
state |ǫ2〉 using unitary UR in the return leg. She waits
until after Alice’s announcement, to select a suitable basis
to jointly measure all her ancillary pairs.
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We will focus on Eve’s most general incoherent attack.
Eve prepares an ancilla in state |0〉, and applies the oper-
ation (4) on the Bob-Eve system. We will assume some
fixed polarization in this and the next subsection, and re-
place a double-ket with a single-ket to represent Alice’s
and Bob’s particles, for simplicity.
|0〉B|0〉E → α00|0〉B|ǫ00〉E + α0⊥|0⊥〉B|ǫ0⊥〉E
|1〉B|0〉E → α10|1〉B|ǫ10〉E + α1⊥|1⊥〉B|ǫ1⊥〉E , (4)
with |α00|2 + |α0⊥|2 = 1 and |α10|2 + |α1⊥|2 = 1, and
|0⊥〉 and |1⊥〉 are states orthogonal to the vacuum state
and |1〉, respectively. The fixed state transmitted over the
channel and the ancilla evolves under (4) to
see eq. (5)
It suffices for our qualitative treatment to consider the
state of the particle in the event when Alice and Bob apply
the operation FA, and Bob registers a detection. It follows
from Eq. (5) that the state of the particle is:
1√
2
(
α10|0〉A|0〉B|ǫ10〉E + α0⊥|1〉A(bˆ|0⊥〉)B |ǫ0⊥〉E
)
, (7)
where bˆ is the annihilation operator on Bob’s mode, and
we have conservatively set |1⊥〉 ≡ |0〉, implying that there
is a probability |α0⊥|2 of a double or multiple count, which
can be detected by Alice in principle.
We note that this detection occurs irrespective of
whether Eve follows up with a further attack on the return
leg, in particular, even if she ‘unattacks’, i.e., reverses the
operation (4). The danger of producing multiple counts
can be avoided by Eve if she uses a weaker attack that con-
serves photon number. We study this in the remainder of
this section in a general setting.
General photon-number-preserving incoherent attack.
The above general attack only indicates that the protocol
is secure if no noise is detected. In practice noise will be
unavoidable, even in the absence of an eavesdropper. On
the other hand, conservatively, we must assume that all
noise is due to Eve, and upper-bound her information on
the secret key, from which the tolerable error rate can be
derived. This task can be difficult for a general model of
attack as above, and we adopt a simpler one here. On
the onward leg, Eve prepares an ancilla in the state |0〉E,
and in the joint systemBE, applies the number-preserving
operation
U = |00〉B〈00| ⊗ U0 + (|01〉B〈01|+ |10〉B〈10|)⊗ U1, (8)
such that 〈0|U †
1
U0|0〉 ≡ 〈Y |N〉 = cos(θ). Eve’s attack in
the onward leg followed produces the state:
U|φ〉AB |0〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ〉|00〉|N〉+ |00〉|ψ〉|Y 〉). (9)
The Alice-Bob action (F, F ) leaves the |φ〉AB unchanged.
In the case of (F,A), the resulting states are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|Y 〉
or 1√
2
|ψ〉|00〉|N〉, of which the former implies detection by
Bob and the latter leads potentially to a D1 detection for
secret bit 1. In the case of (A,F ), the resulting states
are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|N〉 or 1√
2
|00〉|ψ〉|Y 〉, of which the former
implies detection by Alice and the latter leads potentially
to a D1 detection for secret bit 0.
Suppose on the return leg, she ‘unattacks’ the same sys-
tem, i.e., applies U†, and measures the ancilla using a
suitable positive operator-valued measure (POVM). After
the “unattack”, the case FF results in |φ〉AB |0〉, implying
null disturbance and also no information for Eve. In the
case (F,A), the resulting states are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|Y˜ 〉 (where
|Y˜ 〉 ≡ U †
0
U1|0〉) or |ψ〉|00〉|0〉. In the case (A,F ), the re-
sulting states are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|0〉 or 1√
2
|00〉|ψ〉|0〉. Thus a
detection of the probe is in the final state |0〉 whenever the
particle is available for a D1 detection,making Eve equally
unable to say whether a 0 or 1 bit secret was generated.
Allowing 〈Y˜ |0〉 = 0, Eve knows that Bob applied A, but
these are precisely those events where Bob has a detection,
making the particle unavailable for the secret-bit genera-
tion.
More generally, Eve may wish to use a general U ′ rather
than U† in the return leg. Then, if Alice and Bob ap-
plied (F, F ), the final state is 1√
2
(|ψ〉|00〉|N ′〉+|00〉|ψ〉|Y ′〉,
where |N ′〉 = U ′0U0|0〉 and |Y ′〉 = U ′1U1|0〉. In the
case (F,A), the resulting states are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|Y˜ ′〉 (where
|Y˜ ′〉 ≡ U ′0U1|0〉) or |ψ〉|00〉|N ′〉. In the case (A,F ), the re-
sulting states are 1√
2
|00〉|00〉|N ′〉 or 1√
2
|00〉|ψ〉|Y ′〉. In the
cases of relevance, namely the cases (F, F ) and the subset
of events leading to D1 detection following applications of
(F,A) or (A,F ), the state of the probe is obtained by re-
placing |N〉 and |Y 〉 with |N ′〉 and |Y ′〉 in relation to the
situation where no attack takes place in the return leg.
Thus, the most general incoherent-number-preserving
attack that Eve can launch would be to use the above
onward leg attack, and then measure her probe E after
Alice’s announcement. We will assume the worst-case sce-
nario where Eve has complete knowledge of the transmis-
sion schedule between Alice and Bob. Thus she times her
attack to happen just when the particle is about to enter
Bob’s station, and completes it after Alice’s announcement
of D1 events.
It follows from the above that in such events, Eve would
try to determine the secret bit by measuring her probe.
She can optimally try to distinguish between |N〉 and |Y 〉,
which correspond to secret bits 0 and 1, respectively, using
the following optimal POVM [23]:
MN =
1
1 + |〈N |Y 〉| (1− |Y 〉〈Y |),
MY =
1
1 + |〈N |Y 〉| (1− |N〉〈N |),
Minconcl = 1−MN −MY , (10)
where outcomeMN (MY ) indicates deterministic outcome
|N〉 (|Y 〉) andMinconcl represents an inconclusive outcome.
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1√
2
(|0, 1〉+ |1, 0〉)AB|0〉E → 1√
2
(|0〉 [α10|1〉|ǫ10〉+ α1⊥|1⊥〉|ǫ1⊥〉] + |1〉 [α00|0〉|ǫ00〉+ α0⊥|0⊥〉|ǫ0⊥〉]) . (5)
It follows from Eq. (10) that the probability of a conclu-
sive read-out is Pc ≡ 1− |〈N |Y 〉| = 1− cos(θ).
Eve’s information
IBE = Pc = 1− cos(θ) = IAE ≡ IE , (11)
the latter two equalities following from the symmetric na-
ture of Eve’s information after Alice’s announcement. In
the given direction of polarization of the photon, Alice’s
beam splitter may be represented as:
d†
1
=
1√
2
(a† + ib†)
d†
2
=
1√
2
(a† − ib†), (12)
where a†, b† are the creation operators for the modes A,B,
respectively, and d1 and d2 are annihilation operators
corresponding to detections at D1 and D2, respectively.
Hence, the state |φ〉AB evolves to
|φ′〉 = 1√
2
(
d†
1
|0〉AB|+〉E + id†2|0〉AB|−〉E
)
, (13)
where |±〉E ≡ 1√
2
(|N〉E±|Y 〉E). From this, it follows that
Prob(D2|FF ) = 1
2
|||N〉E + |Y 〉E ||2
=
1
2
(1 + cos(θ)). (14)
We thus find that the visibility (2), conditioned on both
applying F , falls from 1 to
V = cos(θ). (15)
For any other of the three pairs of operations by Al-
ice and Bob (e.g., (A,F )), an entanglement of the form
(9) does not arise, and Eve’s attack does not produce a
deviation from the pattern in Table 1.
Combining Eqs. (15) and (11), we find a complemen-
tarity relation
V + IE = 1, (16)
for the visibility during the (F, F ) instances and the in-
formation Eve gains during the D1 outcomes. If the error
rate is e, we have Bob’s information to be IAB = 1−h(e),
where h is the binary entropy. Assuming conservatively
that there is no other noise than that due to Eve, and
that she employs the above attack, the only changes to
Table (1) is the addition of (F, F, 1
2
(1 − cos(θ)) in the
D1 row and modifying the FF entry in the D2 row to
(FF, 1
2
(1 + cos(θ)). Thus error rate e in Eq. (3) becomes,
by Bayesian rule,
e = P (F, F |D1) = P (D1|F, F )P (F, F )
P (D1)
=
1− cos(θ)
2− cos(θ) . (17)
This is an estimate of the error in key, since D1 events
arising from an operation (F.F ) leads to a mismatch in
the private copies of the key. The condition for positive
key rate in the protocol is [24]
K = IAB −min{IAE , IBE} > 0, (18)
whereK are the secret bits that can be distilled after Alice
and Bob perform key reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion. The condition for security in our protocol becomes,
from Eqs. (16) and (18),
h
(
1− cos θ
2− cos θ
)
< cos θ. (19)
or θ . 0.745 rad, which, in view of Eq. (3), implies e .
20.9%.
Discussion and conclusions . – We have presented
a protocol for QKD which is counterfactual on one of the
generated secret bits in that the encoding corresponds to
the blocking or the non-blocking by Bob of a transmitted
particle. This is motivated by observing that the infor-
mation transfer via non-transmission of a particle in the
return leg is possible even classically [25], as we noted ear-
lier. Thus, this cannot be the basis for security. What this
method does achieve is to make the information transfer
counterfactual, whereby Alice is alerted to his blocking ac-
tion by the photon detection at a detector where it would
otherwise be absent (the fact that Bob’s blockade influ-
ences the distant detector is the counterfactual element
here [26]). By contrast, in a classically equivalent protocol,
Alice would be alerted to his blocking by the non-return
of the particle.
In the Noh protocol, Eve’s attempt to eavesdrop the
channel can lead to a blockade-like effect depending on
the sharpness [27] of her eavesdropping operation, thereby
potentially leading to Alice’s counterfactual detection of
the photon even when Bob does not block. This situa-
tion is not unlike in a conventional QKD protocol, such as
BB84, where Eve disturbs the particle when her operation
is inconsistent with Bob’s. The fact that counterfactuality
does not seem to offer any extra cryptographic advantage
(though it gives a new form of communication in quantum
cryptography) forms the basis of our departure from the
Noh protocol.
Like the Noh, Pingpong, LM05 and Deng-Long [28] pro-
tocols, our scheme may be thought of as a two-way QKD
protocol. In common with these, a practical implementa-
tion of our protocol faces certain difficulties because the
photon has to travel twice the distance, which can limit
range and key rate. Moreover, the two interferometric
arms exist in different environments (an external fiber link
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to Bob and a spool at Alice’s station), both requiring sta-
bilization. We believe that these issues pose technological
challenges, that can in principle be surmounted.
To protect the Noh protocol against Trojan-horse at-
tack, one requires time-randomization of the sequence, for
which the difficult task of rapid pulse referencing is re-
quired. With time randomization, the rate at which the
key is generated is not constant, which is undesirable for
network integration. By contrast, because we do not use
polarization encoding, we have used it for detecting Tro-
jan horse attacks, as discussed. Thus time randomization
is not required and pulse referencing is less stringent in our
protocol. Furthermore, because encoding is not polariza-
tion dependent, polarization drift poses a lesser problem
in stabilizing interferometer.
Our protocol differs from each of the above two-way
protocols in one or more key aspects. Our protocol has
Alice sending a fixed state, unlike in the Noh and LM
protocols. It involves single-particle nonlocality unlike in
the LM protocol; finally, unlike in the Pingpong protocol,
it does not involve two particle entanglement. A practical
advantage of not using polarization encoding is that it
makes the protocol secure against a kind of Trojan horse
attack.
We have assumed zero transmission losses, so that ev-
ery particle is accounted for by Alice’s or Bob’s detectors.
Thus, a direction for generalizing our work is to allow for
lossy channels. Another direction is to study how much a
more general incoherent and even coherent attack, helps
Eve.
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